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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the quality of workers' informationregarding
pension offerings using both administrative records and worker reports
of pension provisions. Missing and misinformationproves to be
widespread. Unionized employees, higher income workers and those in
large firms, the better educated, and those with greater seniority are
better informed about their pensions. There are also demographic
differences: nonwhites have less pension knowledge than whites, but
women are better informed than men along several pension dimensions.
Myopia about pension incentive structures is troubling since
workers may save or consume suboptimally, change jobs, or retire
earlier than they would have if equipped with better pension
information. The prevalence of missing data should also be troubling to
empirical pension analysts using data sets reporting workers'
assessments of pension provisions.
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Workernow1ede of Pension Provisions'
This paper explores the topic of what workers know about their
company—sponsored pension plans, and the factors associated with
misinformation and/or missing information about pension features. The
issue is of interest for at least three reasons. First,private-sector
firms providing pensions are legally obliged toprepare and disburse
more than a dozen documents disclosing pension provisions,2 yet some
urge the mandating of yet additional plan documentation on grounds that
workers remain ignorant of their pension plan provisions. There is
little systematic evidence on this matter, or on whether lack of
knowledge is associated with firm—side or worker—side characteristics
making the information gaps more or less costly to correct. A second
reason the question is of interest is that policymakers are concerned
with the problem of economic hardship during retirement. If lowwage,
uneducated or otherwise disadvantaged workers have undue difficulty in
obtaining pension information, they may make myopic and perhaps
suboptimal decisions regarding how much to save for retirement, or when
to change jobs and retire. Hence labor market disadvantagemay be
translated into poverty during retirement. A third group interested in
the question of worker pension knowledge is labor economists. Recent
research posits that pensions spur productivity by tying workers to
firms (Mitchell, 1982), discouraging shirking (Lazear, 1979), and
ensuring optimal retirement flows (Lazear, 1983). Significant gaps in
worker knowledge of pension characteristics would cast doubt on these
roles for company—sponsored pensions.
Previous studies have compared worker knowledge of non—pension job
characteristics with administrative data and discern some important
biases in worker knowledge, but pensions have not been the subject of
careful scrutiny despite their overwhelming importance in the2
compensationpackage.3The objective of the present paper is to
determine how workers' understanding of their pension plansdiffers
from descriptions provided by firms, and the extent towhich pension
misinformation (or lack of information) is systematicallyassociated
with company and worker characteristics. Data are takenfrom the 1983
Survey of Consumer Finances which reports pensioninformation gathered
from both workers and administrative records. SectionI of the paper
describes the data set and response errors. Section IIconsiders
systematic response errors when data are not missing,and then goes on
to examine the pattern of missing data. Section IIIoffers concluding
remarks.
I. Procedures
In a world of perfect and costless information, workerand company
reports regarding specific pension provisionswould be identical.
However reports may diverge if providing and gathering pension
information is costly, and if costs vary systematically across people
and firms. Focusing first on workers, those who do investeffort will
probably be more accurate about their firm's pensionofferings. It is
surmised that such investment will be greater, the more likelythe
employee is to receive benefits and the greaterhe expects them to be
[Ee(B)], and the more readily he can process often complexand
technical pension plan documents (a):
[WorkerInvestment
in Information] =f(Ee(B),I) where f1, f2 >0.
In the dataset to be described below, Ee(B) is proxiedempirically
by a worker's tenure which is expected tobe positively associated with
pension eligiblity, and with benefit levels atretirement (Mitchell and
Luzadis, 1986). Unionized and higher income workers arealso more
likely to anticipate higher benefits (Allenand Clark, 1986). One3
wouldexpect that females and nonwhites would be relatively less well
informed, since benefits are lower for these workers than for white
male employees (Lazear and Rosen, 1987).
The term represents an information—processing efficiency factor,
acknowledging that specialized legal, actuarial and benefit expertise
are often required to understand pension plan documents.4Worker
efficiency of this type should be positively associated with four sets
of employee characteristics: education, income, whetherproduction
employees are prevalent, and inion status. The first three should be
positively associated with general (versus specific) human capital;
union workers may benefit from scale economies in the production and
dissemination of pension information. Workers with more tenure will
presumably embody more firm—specific capital of use in understanding
their firm's pension provisions.
An alternative explanation for erroneous or deficient worker
pension information is that firms may differ in the pension information
provided to workers. Such information is probably more plentiful when
the plan's expected benefits are relatively generous [Er(B)], and the
plan relatively inexpensive to operate ()
[FirmProduction
of Information) =g(Er(B), j.t) whereg>O, g>O.
Empirical evidence on plan generosity and cost parameters is difficult
to obtain. One possibility is that profitable firms are more likely to
provide better benefits (profitability is proxied below by return on
investment, ROl), and hence more accurate worker knowledge regarding
pension provisions. Scale economies in pension administrative costs,
as well as economies in providing pension information, suggest that
workers in firms may be better informed (Mitchell and Andrews,
1981)4
Combiningthe equations above into a model suitable for empirical
analysis produces the following reduced form equation:
Prob. (Disagree) h ( Ee(B), Er(B), ￿,x ).
wherethe dependent variable "Disagree" is equal to one if employer and
employee answers regarding pension provisions arein conflict, and zero
otherwise. Two—way models of this type are estimated below using
maximum likelihood multinomial Logit. In addition, a three-way
extended model addresses the probability of observing missing data,
versus disagreement or agreement between workersand their firms.
Missing data arises when workers are unable to offer answersto
questions regarding their pension provisions.
Data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) are employed
to assess employee misinformation and lack of information regarding
pension provisions. Created by the Federal ReserveBoard of Governors
and the US Department of Health and Human Services, this dataset
consists of two parts (Avery et al. 1984a, b; Curtin, 1985) .Thefirst
component, the Respondent File, is a nationally representative survey
of 3,826 randomly selected households. This file containsinformation
collected by personal interview on each respondent's current employment
status and labor market history, socio—demographiCcharacteristics, and
other attributes (spouses, if any, were queried as well).In addition,
individuals with work experience were questioned about their pension
coverage status. Those so covered wereasked to identify the provider
of that plan ——usuallytheir current employer -—andwere surveyed
about that plan's key features. From this file isextracted a sample
of 750 private sector nonagricultural workers covered by an employer—
provided pension on their current job, ofwhom 637 individuals have
non-missing data on key explanatory variables. Missingvalues on5
dependent variables are not grounds for sample exclusion in the three-
way extended models as explained below.
The second and unique component of the SCF data set is the Pension
File. This contains information from administrative records(Summary
Plan Descriptions, or SPDs) for each pension plan identifiedby covered
individuals in the Respondent file. Since the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) specifies that this SPD is a
legally binding document, Pension File data are expected to accurately
depict pension plan features. The SCF Pension File is the source of
administrative information used in the present analysis. The Pension
File extract used here consisted of 551 different plans pertaining to
the 637 workers identified previously.
The SCF dataset does not report information on firms' benefit
accrual data to compare with workers' assessments of likely retirement
benefits. Nevertheless, even if they were available, such data would
probably be useless. Worker reports about expected benefits will
incorporate a myriad of assumptions about future wage growth, seniority
and age at retirement, inflation, and mortality (among others). In
contrast, current law states that a firm's legal pension obligation
consists only of benefits owed to vested employees based on accrued
service and salary to date if the firm were to cease operation ("shut-
down liability") .Whenthe two sides compute benefits using
underlying assumptions which differ and are unknown to the researcher,
a comparison of benefit amounts is rendered virtually impossible.
Of more interest are three sets of pension plan provisions highly
associated with workers' eventual pension claims. They are interesting
in their own right and also because they have been used as proxies for
pension benefits by other researchers.6 They are:(1) pension plan
type; (2) pension plan contribution data; and (3) pension planb
requirements for early and normal retirement. "Type"refers to whether
the pension is a defined contribution or adefined benefit plan. In
defined benefit (DB) plans, employers promise thatbenefits payable at
retirement will conform to a prespecified functionof the worker's pay
and/or service. In contrast, companies offering adefined contribution
(DC) plan do not specify the retirementformula or payment; rather
they indicate yearly contributions on aworker's behalf, usually a
function of employee pay. "Contribution" provisionsrefer to whether
employees and employers contribute to the pensionfund, and whether
contributions are linked to workers' pay. "Retirement requirements"
pertain to rules regarding benefit eligiblityand the age and/or
service requirements workers must satisfy in order todraw retirement
benefits. Means and standard deviations of pension provisionvariables
are reported in Table 1, as well as the patternof missing observations
(which arise when workers do not provide answersto pension provision
questions)
Plan Type
Table 1 shows that most workers are quite well informedabout what
type of plan they have (TYPE) :employer and employee responses agree
(are identical) almost 90% of thetime.7 However, the agreement rate
on plan type differs among pension types(measured against company
reports) :workers having a DB plan know that they do more oftenthan
employees covered by DC plans. Since most privatesector covered
employees have DE plans (Kotlikoff and Smith,1983), some of those in
DC plans may surmise their plan type from crude knowledgeof pensions
in the labor market as a whole.8 Interestingly, the missingdata rate
for this question also differs by type of plan: manyfewer DC—covered
workers know what type of plan they have as comparedto DB-covered
workers. Both findings suggest that workers in DC planstend to be7
less well—informed about their pensions than are their counterparts in
DB plans.
Contribution Information
Pension plan contributions derive from two sources: employee
payments and employer contributions. Employer contributions, and
earnings on these contributions, are not taxable to a plan participant
until retirement at which point the retiree is usually in a lower tax
bracket. Hence tax—deferral on employer contributions generates
significant tax savings to higher income workers. In contrast,
employee contributions are payable out of after—tax income. This
difference in tax treatment would lead one to expect that higher income
workers would be better informed regarding their own and their
employers' pension contributions.
Worker reports differ considerably from company records regarding
both employee and employer pension contributions. When asked whether
workers themselves are required to contribute (ECONTREQ), a little over
half as many people respond in the affirmative as compared to
employers' files (disagreement is slightly higher in DC plans) .This
high error rate is troubling since pension benefits have been
demonstrated to be higher in plans where employees contribute (Gustman
and Steinmeier, 1987). A high error rate on this variable hence
undermines the expected positive link between anticipated benefit
levels and accuracy of worker information. Missing data on this
question turns not to be widespread; most workers offer opinions about
whether they contribute directly to their pension plans, though many
are incorrect. Those who say they contribute prove relatively well
informed about the association between their contributions and pay
(ECONTPAY), with match rates in the high 90%ts.10 Greater accuracy
among contributing employees confirms practitioners' longstanding claim8
that"sharing in the cost will increase the employees'awareness" of
the pension benefit (Beam and McFadden,1985: p. 479)
Survey questions regarding employercontributions are addressed
only to DC plan participants. Though over90% of the companies report
making pension contributions, onlyhalf as many workers believe that
their employers contribute (RCONT). As with employeecontributions,
most workers answer questions about thenature of employer
contributions though many are incorrect.11Those who do know their
firms contribute are frequently in error aboutthe basis for the
contribution (RCONTPAY). Only 3% of coveredworkers recognize that
employer contributions depend on employee pay,whereas in actuality
firms report that pay is used as a determinantof contributions almost
60% of the time. In addition to low matchrates on this question
(30%), another 16% of the workers do not answerthe question at all.
The prevalence of missing data here callsinto question the notion that
employees place a high value on the provisionof DC pensions, and
further casts doubt on the productivity_enhancingrole of such
pensions. That is, linking pension promisesto employee performance
measures like pay will probably havelittle impact on productivity if
workers do not perceive this critical link.
Requirements for early and normal retirement.
Several questions are available to compareworker and firm views
on retirement formulas among DB planparticipants. Early and normal
retirement provisions are summarized separatelyusing eligibility
variables and variables indicating the degreeof agreement regarding
retirement ages.
Early retirerneflt
All but a handful of pension plans statethat early retirement is
permitted, but only about three-quartersof the respondents believe9
that they will be eligible to retire early (EARLYPOS) 12 These
differences are not surprising given that particular workersmay well
have insufficient seniority to retire early even when a planpermits
some to leave early. However the fact that 17% of the respondents
cannot provide any answer to the early retirement eligibilityquestion
suggests that worker information regarding early retirement rules is
far from complete. This degree of ignorance is especiallydisturbing
since a majority of workers now retires quite early; theaverage
retirement age is about age 63.5 for married men, and 62 for married
women (Fields and Mitchell, 1984; Pozzebon and Mitchell, 1987)
Further evidence on knowledge of retirement rules is available for
the subset of workers who believe they will eventually beeligible for
early retirement.13Eligibility is typically a function of a worker's
age, service, or age plus service; these functions are apparently so
complex that fully 39% of the respondents cannot answer the eligibility
question at all, and those who do respond can estimate early
eligibility requirements accurately only about one—third of the time
(EARLYREQ) .Workers'assessments of their plan's early age are
similarly erroneous. About one-third of the workers do not venture any
guess regarding the plan's early retirement age, and about two—thirds
of those workers who offer answers to early retirement questions are
inaccurate (EARLYAGE)
Normal Retirement:
One would expect that employee information on normal retirement
would be superior to early retirement data, since not all workers are
eligible to retire early but many will eventually qualify for normal
retirement benefits. This surmise is confirmed in the data: virtually
all workers can answer the normal retirement questions and the answers
are fairly accurate. Normal eligibility requirements (NORMREQ) and10
normalretirement ages (NORMAGE) are known by workers atleast twice as
often as compared to the early retirement questions.Despite the fact
that rules vary from one plan to the next regardingeligibility for and
the age of normal retirement, workers appear tohave far better
information than they do for early retirement provisions.This finding
is reassuring insofar as normal retirement provisions arethe single
most important plan provision predicting benefit generosity(Gustman
and Steinmeier, 1987)
II. Mu].tivariate Ana1ysiS
A multivariate Logit approach is used to judgewhether
disagreement on pension type,contributionrules, and retirement
variables is systematic. Explanatory variables sketchedabove are drawn
from the SCF, which contains information onindividual worker
responses, and industry-level averages,used to proxy key firm—level
variables because individual firms are not identifiedin the dataset.
The latter are merged with the micro datafile using2— and 3-digit SIC
industry codes. An Appendix Table summarizesdescriptive statistics for
all explanatory variables along with data sourcesand definitions.
Response Differences
Table 2 reports estimated multinomnial Logitcoefficients from a
model relating a vector of worker and firm-sidecharacteristics to two—
way (disagree/agree) outcomes. Here apositive coefficient indicates a
higher probability of worker/plan disagreementregarding a pension
provision, while a negative coefficientindicates a greater probability
of agreement. Supplemental models are alsoestimated to determine
whether whether vested workers or older workers arein possession of
better pension information (complete results arenot reported in full
because of space constraints, but are available onrequest). Table 3
extends the analysis to a three—way formulationwhich includes11
observations with missing data for the dependent variables where
missing data is widespread. Here two columns of results appear for
each dependent variable. n the first column, a positive (negative)
coefficient indicates the variable increases (decreases) the
probability of a missing data reports versus agreement between the
worker and the employer; and in the second column a positive (negative)
coefficient indicates a higher (lower) probability of disagreement
versus agreement. In addition both tables display Chi-square statistics
testing the hypothesis that a constant term summarizes the data as well
as the vector of coefficients appearing in the column directly above.
Pension Type (TYPE) : Many workers are wrong about their pension type
and many cannot answer the question at all. Nevertheless, few
explanatory variables are systematically associated with disagreement
error in the multivariate analysis.14 No firm—side factor is
statistically significant at conventional levels. The statistically
signficant findings for worker—side variables are consistent with
predictions: unionized employees are less likely to disagree with their
companies regarding type (Tables 2 & 3), a finding compatible with
scale economies; and workers with longer job tenure are less likely to
have missing data (Table 3) suggesting more investment among those
closer to retirement. There are also race differences: Table 3
indicates that nonwhites reveal less pension knowledge than do whites
with regard to pension type. Adding age and tenure interactions
(results not shown) confirms the strong effect unions have on this form
of pension knowledge, particularly among those nearest retirement, but
weakens the statistical significance of the race effect.
Pension Contributions: Tabulations above demonstrated that worker
information regarding contributions is not particularly accurate vis a
vis administrative records. Multivariate analysis of both employee12
contribution variables in Table 2 shows that the inaccuracy is
systematic with regard to firm size, and in the predicted direction.15
Employees in large firms are generally more knowledgeable both about
their own contributory status (ECONTREQ) and the links between their
contributions and their pay (ECONTPAY), perhaps because of scale
economies in the production of pension information. The data are not
completely in accord with predictions however; for instance, missing
data is more prevalent regarding ECONTPAY for union workers (Table 3),
which contradicts the scale economies view just enunciated.16 Another
surprising outcome is the result that women are more likely, rather
than less likely, to know about how employee pension contributions are
determined ——contraryto the notion that those expecting less will
invest less in pension information (see Tables 2 &3;this finding is
also especially robust to the inclusion of age and tenure
interactions.)
While few worker and firm—side variables explain disagreement
patterns on employee's required pension contributions, the evidence is
even weaker for questions regarding employer contributions (RCONT,
RCONTPAY). Employees' views are quite inaccurate, but the errors are
apparently not systematically associated with any of the variables
included in the empirical analysis (including age and seniority
interactions); this is confirmed by the small Chi—square values.
Separate analysis on missing data is precluded by small sample sizes.
Retirement Requirements:
Early retirement (EARLYPOS, EARLYAGE): Response accuracy on early
retirement questions is strongly linked to several worker—side and
afew firm—side variables. Educated workers tend to know whether their
plan has an early retirement option (Table 2), while educationand
tenure improve worker accuracy in estimating a plan's early retirement13
ageand further reduce the likelihood thata worker cannot offer any
opinion regarding early retirement provisions (Tables 2& 3). Both
sets of findings support the view that those who havemore to gain will
be more likely to invest in the information.However Table 3 also
indicates that educated and senior workersare more rather than less
likely to have missing data when it comes toknowledge of early
retirement requirements, and thisperverse education effect is robust
to the inclusion of age and tenure interactions. itappears as though
this group focuses merely on theage requirements for early retirement
because they have already fulfilled the plan'sseniority conditions,
which explains why they know theage provision but do not know the
combination of age plus service. Reportingpatterns differ across sex
and race in the ways discerned previously:women are better informed
regarding whether early retirement is possible, but nonwhitesare less
well informed about early retirement provisions.Models allowing
interactive terms for age and seniority show that thereare fewer
systematic error patterns among older and more senior workers,as
compared to younger ones. Low income turns out to be a predictor of
missing data for both the early retirement age and forearly retirement
requirements. In general, the findings support the hypothesis that
employees more likely to receive benefits do invest more inpension
information, at least insofar as early retirement benefitsare
concerned.
Only one firm—side variable, ROl, is a significant predictor of
one outcome, EARLYPOS, in both the two- and three—way models. This
implies, consistent with predictions, that profitable firms offer
better information regarding the possibility of early retirement,
insofar as their workers are less likely to have missinganswers to
pension questions and the answers offered are on target more often.14
Patterns for other firm-side variables areless clearcut in all the
models examined.
Normal Retirement (NORMREQ, NORAGE): Virtuallyall SCF workers are
able to provide accurate answers to the normalretirement questions
making it unnecessary to analyze missingdata patterns. Worker/firm
disagreement over normal retirement provisionsis not very systematic.
With regard to both NORMAGE and NORMREQ, familyincome is the only
significant worker—side variable and notin the anticipated direction:
higher income workers are less ratherthan more accurate. It may be
that they report their own anticipated retirement agesrather than the
plan's normal retirement age, though whythis would be more prevalent
for upper income workers is not clear. The solefirm—side factor which
enters significantly, ROl, is associatedwith more agreement regarding
normal retirement ages, as anticipated. These patternsdo alter when
age and seniority interactions arecontrolled. As a whole, then,
misinformation regarding normal retirement provisionsis both less
prevalent and less systematic than for earlyretirement provisions
studied.17
iii.Discussion and ConclusiOnS
Comparing administrative records with workerknowledge of pension
provisions yields some informative insightsregarding worker knowledge
of their pension plan provisions. First, pensionmisinformation and
missing information are quite widespread,with information deficiencies
being the most severe for provisionsrelating to the requirements for
early retirement. Specifically, aboutone—third of workers queried
cannot answer questions about early retirementrequirements at all, and
about two-thirds of those workers whooffer answers to early retirement
questions are wrong. This is disturbingin light of the widespread
popularity of early retirement.Workers' answers are more accurate for15
questionsabout normal eligibility and retirementages. Since benefit
levels are closely tied to normal retirement provisions, it is
reassuring to observe better information about these provisions.
Having pointed out where workers are informed, the question
remains as to what is associated with good information.Generally
speaking, good information appears more prevalentamong unionized
employees, workers in large firms, the better educated, thehigher
income, and those with greater seniority. These findingssupport the
hypotheses that information is more accurate when benefitsare expected
to be more generous, and when there are technical efficienciesin
producing and processing pension information. There are alsosome
surprising demographic differences: nonwhites reveal less pension
knowledge than do whites with regard to pension type andearly
retirement provisions, but women appear better informedalong several
pension dimensions.
These findings clearly show that regulationscurrently on the
books have not resolved the problem of worker ignoranceregarding key
pension plan features. More research is needed on the best and least—
cost mechanisms of generating more pension information, but itseems
clear that better pension data would, to some degree, benefitless
advantaged workers.18 A related point is that policymakers are
concerned with the problem of economic hardship during retirement.Low
wage, nonunion workers in small firms apparently find it difficult to
obtain and process pension information, and hence will also bemore
likely to make myopic and perhaps suboptimal decisions regarding when
to change jobs or retire, or how much to save for retirement. Thismay
be one method by which disadvantage during the worklife tends tocarry
over to the retirement period.16
Finally,the results are relevant for pension researchers. On the
one hand it is reassuring to find thatworkers most likely to receive
pensions are, in fact, most aware of key plan provisions.After all,
pension plans are costly to maintain andwould presumably not be
offered (in the private sector at least) unless somesubset of workers
perceived them as providing valuable benefits.On the other hand, data
sets which report workers' assessments of pension provisionscontain a
great deal of error and some seriousunderstatements regarding
contributions and retirement eligibility. Consequentlyresearchers
using worker—side reports of benefit provisionswill underestimate the
generosity of pension plans covering these workers,and overstate the
degree of eventual retirement income inequality.Measurement error
also appears to be correlated with variables commonlyincluded in
economic models involving pensions (e.g. unions,firmsize), so that
studies relying on worker—side provision informationwill generate
biased coefficient estimates.19 In addition, itshould be recognized
that employee misperception of pension incentivestructures may induce
workers to save (or consume) suboptimally, change jobs, orretire
earlier or later, than they would have done had theybeen equipped with
better pension information.20 Further research onhow pension
expectations are formed may help explain whyworker behavior frequently
deviates from fully optimal labor market and savings paths.17
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literature on wage/pension tradeoff.21
6For example, pension type and contributory status are used by
Ippolito (1986) as proxies for benefit levels in a wage—pension
tradeoff equation. Normal and early retirement ages and pension
contributory status are used by Ehrenberg (1980) in a similar context.
The SCF Respondent File terminology in this instance differs slightly
from that used to code administrative records in the Pension File.
Workers with pensions were asked whether they have a "money
accumulation plan" (which most would probably take to mean a DC plan),
or a "plan based on service" (which most would probably equate with a
DB plan), or, in a few cases, a third option —-"both".Initial
examination of the "both" category indicated that these are probably DB
plans, and they are coded as DE's in the analysis below. In contrast,
the Pension File indicates whether a pension's documents were those of
a DC plan, a DB plan, or whether both kinds of documents were forwarded
to the surveyors. Preliminary analysis of the "both" group in this
case suggested that these are firms offering both a primary DB plan
with a secondary DC plan (probably benefiting primarily high—wage
workers) .Inthe few cases where a firm reported offering plans with
both a DB and a DC component, these were combined with the DB plans
since their DC components appeared to have been later, and minor,
additions. Therefore for the purpose of the plan "type" analysis,
plans with two documents are coded as DB.
8 Various measures of association are available (Goodman and Kruskal,
1979) .Areferee suggested using the following measure:
£log {prob(yes,yes)prob(no,no)/prob(yes,no)prob(no,yes)},
which takes account of the fact that the ease of finding matching
answers depends on the simple probabilities. The value of £ ranges
from plus to minus infinity, with independence indicated by a value of
zero. For TYPE, £ =+2.47,indicating that errors are not independent;22
workers exaggerate the probability of being in a DB plan relative to
employers' reports of DB coverage. Systematic error patterns are
examined in more depth in the next section.
The value of £ is +1.26 for ECONTREQ (see note 8), indicating that
errors are not independent: many more workers believed they werenot
required to contribute than actually was the case.
10 In 2—3% of the cases, pension documents did not indicate whether or
not employee contributions were proportionate to pay. This is the only
case where administrative records contain missing data.
11 Though other factors are not held constant, the errors do not appear
systematic since £ =0.1(where 0 implies independence; see note 8)
12 Here £ =+1.46implying that errors are not independent; workers'
answers are more often negative than are employers'.
13 In some cases plans have more than one set of early retirement
requirements or ages. A worker's answer to the early retirement
question was judged a "match" if his answer agreed with anyof the
formulas given in his pension plan document. A similar approach was
followed for the normal retirement variables. This method provides a
conservative estimate of the degree of worker inaccuracy regarding
pension provisions; greater inaccuracy results from narrower
definitions of retirement eligibility rules.
14 Though many individual coefficients are not statistically
significant, at the 10% significance level the Chi—squarestatistic on
TYPE in Table 2 implies rejection of the null hypothesis that the
entire vector of coefficients except for the constant term is equal to
zero. On the other had the null cannot be rejectedfor the TYPE
equation in Table 3.23
15Chi—square values for the ECONTREQ and ECONTPAY models in both
Tables imply rejection of the null hupothesis that all coefficients but
the constant term are zero at least at the 10% level.
16 There are too few missing observationsfor ECONTREQ to analyze this
dependent variable in a three—way model.
17 Chi—square values for all butone of the normal and early retirement
variables imply rejection of the null hupothesis that all coefficients
but the constant term are zero at least at the 10% level; the exception
is EARLYREQ in Table 2 alone.
18Obviously it is necessary to assess whether increases in labor costs
as a result of providing additional pension information would be offset
by lost jobs or other benefits. This task is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
19 Examples of studiesusing worker—side assessments of pension
variables include Mellow (1981) and Clark and McDermed (1986)
20This may explain why, for example, Fields and Mitchell (1984) find
that economic factors explain only about a quarter of the variance in
retirement behavior, and why Bernheim (l987a) reports that the economic
life cycle savings hypothesis is found to be only partly borne out by
savings data.Table 1.









EJP.LYPOS (l=Earlyret. poss., 0.770.17
0=not)
EARLYREQ(Yrs of age, service
both req. for early?)
EARLYAGE(Earlyret. age)
Normal Retirement:
NORNR.EQ(What age, serv. or 0.680.01
both req. 8 normal retirement?)
NORMAGE (Normal ret. age) 0.570.00
I. VARIABLES AVAILABLE FOR ALLPLANS
A. Plan Type
TYPE (l=DB,2=DC)
1.47 0.00 Entire sample 0.870.19 1.100.19
1.00 0.00 Those with DB plans 0.94









0.20 0.00 Entire sample 0.78 0.0]. 0.12
0.18 0.00 Those with DB Plans 0.780.01 0.120.01
0.00 Those with DC plans 0.790.02 0.130.02 0.29
ECONTPAY (1=EE contr. % of pay,0=not)
0.06 0.03 0.02 Entire sample 0.950.07
0.03 0.02 Those with DB plans 0.960.08 0.030.06
0.02 0.08 0.03 Those with DC plans 0.940.04 0.09
II. VARIABLES CREATED FOR DCPLANS
RCONT(l=ER contrib.,Onot) 0.480.00
RCONTPAY (l=ER contrib % 0.290.16
of pay, 0=not)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: SCF Respondent File
Years with current employer
Source: SCF Respondent File
Family income (000$)
Source: SCF Respondent File
l=yes, 0=no
Source: SCF Respondent File
Number of employees per firm by industry
Source: US Bureau of the Census. County Business
Patterns. 1982. Table la. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1984.
Return on investment by industry
Source: Leo Troy. Almanac of Business and Industrial
Financial Ratios. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice—Hall,
1984.
Proportion of production employees per firm by industry.
Source: Statistical Abstract. Table 661. Washington,
D.C.: USGPO, 1985.
Mean Values
(standard deviations)
Workers with
DB Plans DCPlans
0.34(0.47) 0.45(0.50)
0.12(0.32) 0.11(0.31)
12.98(2.43) 13.59(2.37)
12.45(10.26) 10.02(9.85)
29.73(26.54) 45.72(80.12)
0.45(0.50) 0.11(0.31)
58.54(51.31) 40.55(42.76)
9.33(4.53) 10.84(4.56)
0.87(0.23) 0.91(0.20)
Variab' -.
FEMALE
NONWHITE
EDUCATION
TENURE
INCOME
UNION
File
File
FSIZE
ROl
PRODTOT